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The claim is often made that welfare recipientsmove to states where benefits
are more readily available in more generous amounts. To test that claim,
this study uses data on state General Assistance (GA) programs, as well
as data on single men from the Public Use MicrodataSet of the 1990 U.S.
Census. We find only slightevidence that men who lack access to GA seek it
elsewhere, and overall we find that the availabilityof GA has no more than
a marginaleffect on the location decisions of the men we studied. It seems
that poor people, like other people, are interested in more than government
benefits (orotherfinancial considerations)when they make such decisions.
Among other things, they are likely to care about the quality of their social
relations, including networks of family and friends that serve as critical
sources of support.

Claims of widespread welfare migration have provided substantial fuel for the recent politics of American welfare reform.
Thus, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) gave states the authority to apply
different eligibility standards to applicants who have lived instate for less than 12 months (Lurie 1997). By July 1,1997,15 states
had adopted this option, most often limiting such applicants to
the benefits they received in their prior state of residence (APWA
1997). In response, litigation has argued that such differential
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, June, 1999, Volume XXVI, Number 2
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treatment of newcomers is contrary to the United States Supreme
Court ruling in Shapiro v. Thompson [394 U.S. 618 (1969)], which
struck down durational residency requirements for public assistance on the grounds that they undermined a basic constitutional
right to travel.'
Contemporary discussions of the migration of indigents are
dominated by rational actor theories which argue that many poor
migrants seek to "maximize their utility" by taking welfare in
lieu of work, and by moving toward the highest available benefit
check (Peterson and Rom 1990). Some analyses combine this motif
with old themes from the culture of poverty debate, recycled
in recent years to explain "welfare dependency," a lamentable
addiction to public assistance that results from a chronic lack of
personal responsibility ("character") among some groups of poor
people (Murray 1984; Mead 1992). Recent policy innovations have
thus emphasized the treatment of individual pathologies through
"behavior modification" (Albelda and Tilly 1997). The high point
of this wave of "new paternalism" (Mead 1997) was the PRWORA
of 1996, but the trend toward "behavioral requirements" for initial and continuing eligibility started much earlier, out on the
margins of the social welfare system, in General Assistance (GA)
programs run by the states and their counties (Barnes, Baumohl,
and Hopper 1992).
GA programs are of a residual sort, providing aid to individuals who can not qualify for higher-benefit, federally-supported
programs (Center on Welfare Policy and Law 1994; Greenberg and
Baumohl 1996). For nearly a decade, in state and local political
environments shaped by fiscal restraint and bitter conflicts about
priorities and trade-offs, GA programs have undergone benefit
cutbacks and eligibility restrictions (Halter 1996; Greenberg and
Baumohl 1996). The state-level politics of GA retrenchment progressed along the same lines as the later and better-known politics
of national welfare reform: In state after state, critics attacked
GA programs for tolerating dependency; charged that the selfserving nature of dependency gave rise to welfare migration; and
averred that GA benefits must be cut to avoid attracting more of
the welfare poor (see Glasser 1996). Some GA programs adopted
the practice of limiting the eligibility of newcomers (Hershkoff
and Loffredo 1997: 104-5).
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In what follows, we assess the empirical basis for the persistent and powerful claim that GA benefits inspire interstate migration. While researchers have studied extensively the relat"_"ship
between Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and
the migration of female-headed families (see Moffitt 1992), little
attention has beendevoted to the relationship between GA and
the residential decisions of single males, the principal (though not
singular) recipient group in GA programs.
On the evidence, we argue for a fundamental revision in
the conceptualization of welfare migration. Typically, researchers
have asked whether more generous programs attract migrants,
and such inquiry usually has been framed by rational-choice
models of decision-making which emphasize the logic of moving
so as to maximize benefits. (For a review of the literature, see
Moffitt 1992; for an example, see Peterson and Rom 1989; for
a critique, see Schram 1995). Given our research, we think that
migrants do not focus on welfare benefits as a means to maximize economic advantage. Further, "maximizing utility" involves
more than maximizing income (see Schram, Nitz and Krueger
1998; Schram and Soss 1999). Migrants seem more interested in
increasing their access to "social capital," including their ability
to participate in supportive networks of kith and kin (Stack 1974
and 1996; Milofsky et al. 1993). We think that such motives have
been neglected in recent research about welfare migration, and
we would make them central to future inquiry.
We argue for this reorientation on both theoretical and policy
grounds. Theoretically, the pursuit of access to social capital,
even when unsuccessful, likely explains the lack of compelling
evidence that welfare recipients move across state lines to more
generous programs. As a matter of policy, in an era of restricted
welfare eligibility, stingy programs may not so much respond to
migration as they may create it by sending poor people in search
of far-flung family and friends on whom they can rely, if only for
a time.
GENERAL ASSISTANCE
General Assistance is a generic name for state and local programs that provide ongoing or time-limited assistance to low-
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income persons. It refers to means-tested programs that serve individuals who do not qualify for Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF, what was AFDC), or Supplemental Security Income (SSI, the federal welfare program for the aged, blind, or
long-term disabled)-or who are awaiting an eligibility decision
by these or other income maintenance programs. Although GA
is the most common name, some states and localities use others:
General Relief, Home Relief, and Direct Assistance.
GA programs are designed, passed into law, and funded by
state and local governments. Predictably, this has produced a
myriad program variations across the country. Funding arrangements for GA programs differ considerably, with some states
providing all of the funds, others engaging in shared-funding
partnerships with localities, and still others leaving localities to
fend for themselves. Many states do not have GA programs, or GA
is operated in only some local jurisdictions. In states and counties
without GA, one usually finds substitute services, such as shelters
for housing and soup kitchens for food (Moon and Schneiderman
1995). In these areas, local poor relief looks very much like it did
a century ago.
GA benefit levels and eligibility rules also vary from state to
state, and in many states, notably California and Wisconsin, from
county to county. Some states restrict GA eligibility to older people not yet eligible for SSI or Social Security retirement benefits;
to parents waiting for TANF benefits or temporarily suspended
from that program or ineligible while their children are in protective custody; to those with an SSI application pending; or to
those who are realistically unemployable by some critieria of age
or infirmity but who do not meet the stringent disability criteria
of SSI. States and localities also employ different definitions of
financial need based on income and asset limits.
Like eligibility rules, the structure and amount of GA benefits also vary across states and localities. Assistance assumes
many forms: cash payments, vouchers, vendor payments, and
in-kind benefits. The amounts of benefits vary widely, though
as Greenberg and Baumohl (1996:74) point out, "GA programs
share one fundamental characteristic: low benefit levels." In 1992,
the maximum GA cash benefit for a single adult reported by
states with uniform statewide programs ranged from lows of $27
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per month in South Carolina and $80 per month in Missouri to
highs of $384 per month in Massachusetts and $407 per month in
Hawai'i (Burke 1995: 78).
THE GA RETRENCHMENT
GA policy responds to different financial incentives than did
policy for AFDC (Uccello, McCallum, and Gallagher 1996). Under the old AFDC system, state expenditures were augmented
according to a federal matching formula which obligated the
federal government to absorb new costs when state program
expenses increased. When states cut program expenditures, they
also reduced the flow of federal dollars. PRWORA ended this
system and created an incentive structure somewhat closer to that
which has always informed GA policymaking. Because TANF
block grants are not tied to current state expenditures, states that
spend more in a given year must absorb all of their costs; and
states that spend less are allowed to keep all of their savings.
Thus, states have more to lose by generosity and more to gain
through miserliness.
Because states and localities own all of the costs or benefits associated with GA programs, historically these have been
dramatically affected by ebbs and flows in state economies and
political pressures for fiscal retrenchment. Relative to other social
welfare programs, GA has been politically vulnerable and poorly
funded. Indeed, part of the difficulty of tracking GA programs
over time across the states is that they are subject to frequent benefit fluctuations (usually downward) and changes in eligibility
rules (usually in the direction of more restrictions).
During the 1991-92 economic slowdown, cuts in GA programs offered states and localities a way to save money without suffering any corresponding loss in federal funds (Barnes,
Baumohl, and Hopper, 1992; Halter 1996). The result was a nationwide stampede toward program retrenchment. As the first
states began to cut GA programs, others worried openly about
becoming welfare magnets for poor, single men. In the end, 17
states made cuts in GA, including Michigan, which terminated
its program (Danziger and Kossoudji 1994-95; Halter 1996; Urban Institute 1996). This purge left only 26 states providing GA
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benefits for more than 6 months, 3 for 6 months or less, and 3
providing one-time emergency grants (Moon and Schneiderman
1995).
The human consequences of these cutbacks are a matter of
dispute. However, findings from a survey of states conducted
by the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law (1994:1) suggest
that, contrary to many policymakers' expectations, people terminated from GA were often not able to go to work. For example,
in Michigan, "over 80 percent of former GA recipients, nearly
66,000 individuals, did not work for most of the year, following
GA termination." In Pennsylvania, "nearly two-thirds of those
surveyed lacked paid employment during an entire six-month
period, two full years after being cut from GA." Anthony Halter
(1996:107) suggested that the primary reason the GA cutbacks
did not produce higher levels of work among former recipients is
that many "suffered from health problems that made it extremely
difficult for them to find work but did not entitle them to disability
benefits." While many states developed systematic programs to
transfer disabled people to SSI, those who failed to qualify for SSI
were not necessarily employable (Lewin-VHI, Inc.1995).
Thus, increased hunger and homelessness were common results. The Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law (1994:2) reported: "Former recipients could not rely on private charity to
meet their needs for food, shelter, and medical care. As a result,
25 percent of Michigan GA recipients reported being homeless
within 7 months after the program was eliminated, up from 2
percent before termination." Other problems short of increased
hunger and homelessness also were associated with termination
from GA: In Pennsylvania, "utility shutoffs and evictions went
from 9.4 per cent for GA recipients before discontinuance to 18.4
[per cent] after" (Halter 1996:109).
Along with GA cutbacks came more emphasis on workfare.
Although the recent emphasis on workfare in programs serving
poor, single mothers with children has received more attention,
it is long pre-dated by the use of workfare in GA programs,
where the practice was employed to discourage recipients from
taking benefits while also receiving wages from unreported work.
Whether GA workfare "smokes out" recipients who work offbook is subject to debate; that it allows recipients to prepare for
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market-based jobs that might sustain them is even more dubious
(Finder 1998).
In sum, by the mid-1990s, the GA retrenchment had established features: access frequently was restricted to the disabled;
benefits were reduced; time limits and behavioral requirements
for the receipt of aid were imposed; and participation in workfare
programs increasingly was required.
This retrenchment was fueled in good part by fears of welfare
migration. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, fears of welfare migration
had spread even to remote Hawai'i. In spite of its liberal tradition,
Hawaii's legislators capped GA expenditures in 1995, drastically
cut benefits, and for a time limited how long recipients could
receive them. The main reason given for these drastic actions
was the alleged migration of poor, single males to Hawai'i to
take advantage of a "good deal [in GA benefits]" (Hawai'iSenate
Journal 1995: 669-670). There was scant evidence to document
these fears, but they nonetheless propelled Hawai'i to join in a
GA retrenchment that was as wide as it was deep.
WELFARE MIGRATION: SUBSTANCE OR SYMBOLISM?
Given the political power of welfare migration claims, it is
important to inquire about their validity. Although welfare migration may be unlikely in Hawai'i, to what extent have policy
disparities on the mainland been sufficient to motivate migration?
To date, little is known about the extent of GA-inspired migration in the United States. However, suggestive evidence can
be gleaned from the well-researched relationship between AFDC
benefits and the migration of poor families with dependent children. Three waves of studies address this question, each supplanting the findings and conventional wisdom of its predecessor
(see Schram, Nitz and Krueger 1998). Thomas Dye (1990: 69)
summarized the shift in substantive findings between the first
and second waves of studies as follows: "Early studies suggested
that the poor migrate for job opportunities and family reasons
with little knowledge of welfare rules and payments in various
jurisdictions. More recent studies suggest that the poor migrate
opposite net flows and toward high benefit states."
The most significant second-wave study was by Peterson
and Rom (1989 and 1990). Like many others, they imputed strict
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economic rationality both to welfare recipients making residential decisions and to state governments making welfare policies.
That is, they assumed that welfare recipients rationally migrate
toward higher benefits and that higher benefit states rationally
respond by letting their benefits decline faster than other states.
As evidence for this dynamic relationship, the authors reported
that states with high benefits at an earlier point in time tend to see
their poor populations grow during the subsequent period (either
through attraction or retention of poor people). Peterson and Rom
found that in response, states cut back on benefits in a "race
to the bottom" in order to avoid becoming "welfare magnets."
However, because Peterson and Rom (1990) used data aggregated
at the state level, problems of cross-level inference seriously limit
what they can conclude about individual behavior from statelevel data.
A more recent, third wave of studies relies instead on large, nationwide, individual-level data sets. These studies uniformly find
almost no support for the welfare migration hypothesis and raise
questions about the persistence of the focus on whether relatively
more generous state programs attract recipients (Walker 1994;
Hanson and Hartman 1994; Schram and Krueger 1994; Levine and
Zimmerman 1995; Frey et. al. 1995; Gresenz 1997; Schram, Nitz,
and Krueger 1998; Allard and Danziger 1998). This substantial
body of work strongly suggests that AFDC-inspired migration
was a marginal phenomenon. Our confidence in this conclusion
is bolstered by the fact that several of these studies converge in
the magnitude of their estimates: Hanson and Hartman (1994),
Schram, Nitz, and Krueger (1998), and Allard and Danziger (1998)
all found that interstate migration among poor, single-mother
families occurred at a rate of no more than 5% per year, and all
found that the interstate migration of such families from lower to
higher benefit states was even less.
Despite the strength of these findings for AFDC, there are
plausible reasons to think that GA migration might be greater. GA
programs always have varied more than did AFDC programs,
raising the potential for stronger migration incentives. Because
GA recipients are usually single men, and in the vast majority
of cases, individuals without children, they may be less tied to
extended kin networks in a given locale. For this same reason,
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GA recipients are likely to incur lower moving costs, and can
contemplate a move across state borders without worrying about
how it might affect children. With such issues in mind, we turn
to an empirical analysis of GA migration.
MEASURING GA MIGRATION
To analyze the effects of GA provision on the migration of
single, poor men, we examined GA programs during the period
preceding the widespread cutbacks of the early 1990s. This was a
time of relative stability in GA eligibility standards and in the
GA rolls: the nationwide number of recipients dropped only
slightly, from 1.35 million in 1985 to 1.12 million in 1989 (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1986, 1990). In spite
of recession, by 1992, the number of recipients, 1.21 million, was
still within this range (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services 1995). Thus, this pre-retrenchment period makes for a
good test of the GA migration hypothesis: Because programs were
fairly stable, we can see if over this time period state programs
with particular characteristics attracted or lost people from the
program-relevant population of poor, single men. Our analysis is
based on interstate migration on the mainland (that is, excluding
Hawai'i and Alaska), and focuses on poor, single men, 24 to 54
years of age, who did not graduate from high school. Given
the characteristics of this population-single, under-educated,
low-income-the analysis that follows can be considered a limit
case for the issue of welfare migration. If there is little welfare
migration among this group, there is unlikely to be much among
any population.2
To test whether states with GA programs with particular
characteristics experienced GA.migration, we grouped them into
3 categories: 8 states with statewide GA programs that extended
eligibility without time-limits to employable, non-disabled adults
under 65 years of age; 27 states (and the District of Columbia) with
statewide GA programs that failed to meet these criteria; and 13
states with only emergency assistance (if that) and no statewide
GA program.3 This tripartite distinction served as the basis for
several dichotomous variables used in our multivariate analyses
of our data (discussed below). In particular, our analysis focuses
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on whether there was migration to states in the first categoryi.e., those "top GA states" with statewide programs that extended
eligibility to employable, non-elderly individuals. We also test to
see if there was migration away from states in the last categoryi.e., those with no statewide GA program.
To test these hypotheses, we examine the period from 1985 to
1990 using data from the 1990 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata
Set (PUMS) 5% sample. We use data on all non-institutionalized,
single men 24-54 years of age, who had not completed high
school, had incomes below the poverty level, and were living in
the continental 48 states and the District of Columbia in 1990. We
restrict our analysis to this group in order to exclude younger men
who moved out of state for post-secondary education and older
men who are automatically treated as unemployable by many GA
programs.
The PUMS is a large national data set that enables us to see
if people were living in a different state in 1990 than they were
in 1985. Thus, we can test to see if poor, employable, single men
who did move during that period were more likely to move to
a state where they could qualify for General Assistance. We also
can check to see if they came from a state that would be less
likely to offer them GA. With these data, we can also calculate
the probability of moving based on the availability of GA in the
state of origin. We can also calculate the probability of receiving
any form of public assistance after an interstate move. We present
these findings below.
The PUMS provides data on numerous other factors that
might affect interstate migration. In our multivariate analyses,
we control for whether men were living in 1985 in the state where
they were born, as people living in their state of origin are less
likely than others to leave. We also control for race, age, education,
marital status, and disability. We also examine the jobs to working
age population ratio on the grounds that job availability affects
interstate migration.
MODELING GA MIGRATION
We start our examination of the PUMS data by comparing the
1985-1990 interstate migration rates for single men, single women
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and single women with children, aged 24-54, who had incomes
below the poverty level and had not completed high school. We
find that these rates are very similar: gender and the presence of
children do not affect interstate migration rates very much at all:
% Living in a Different State in 1990 Than in 1985 N
Single Men

8.2

34,652

Single Women

6.7

7,465

Single Women with Children

9.8

45,570

Less than 10% of each group moved out of state between 1985 and
1990, an annual interstate migration rate of less than 2%. Thus, if
there is any welfare migration, it is a marginal phenomenon.
Single mothers with children moved out of state most frequently and were most likely to be eligible for public assistance
(AFDC in the years analyzed); however, as discussed above, extensive research has demonstrated that there is very little welfare
migration by poor, single mothers with children. In our PUMS
group of poor, single mothers with children, only 48% of the
approximately 10% who were migrants moved to a higher benefit
state between 1985 and 1990 and only 47% of all these migrants
were receiving public assistance in 1990.
Next, we compare the male migrants and non-migrants. Table
1 indicates that there were few major differences between migrants and non-migrants, and the differences were not consistent
with the popular logic of welfare migration. Migrants were less
likely than non-migrants to be living (in 1990) in a state with
a statewide GA program that extended eligibility to employable
persons (19% vs. 26%). In 1990, migrants were slightly more likely
to be living in a state that did not offer GA on a statewide basis
(25% vs. 22%).
Table 1 also indicates that migrants were more likely to have
been working in 1989 (55% vs. 42%), and to have more income
from sources other than public assistance ($2575 vs. $2065 on
average); to be white (60% vs. 50%); to have completed at least the
9th grade of school (57% vs. 51%); to be living (in 1990) in group
quarters (14% vs. 7%) or in a household of one person (47% vs.
45%); and to be slightly younger (on average, 35 vs. 37 years of
age). Migrants were less likely to have been never married at some
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Table 1

Migrant and Non-MigrantPoor Single Males, Age 24-54, Without a
High School Degree, 1990.
Non-Migrants
(Same State as '85)
Worked Last Year
Living Alone
Living in Group Quarters
Race=White
Age
Never Married
Disability (Limits Work)
Disability (Prevents Work)
Finished 9 th Grade or Beyond
Living in State of Origin
Non Public Assistance Income
Receiving Public Assistance
Living in a Top GA State
Living in a State with No GA
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the
ratio of Workers to Working Age
Pop. for the State of Residence in
1990
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the
ratio of Workers to Working Age
Pop. for the State of Residence in
1985
Moved to a Top GA State from a
More Restrictive State
Moved From a Top GA State to a
More Restrictive State
Number of Cases

Migrants
(Different State)

41.6%
44.9%
6.9%
49.8%
36.6
61.4%
35.5%
25.8%
51.2%
65.8%
$2,065.38
21.2%
25.8%
22.1%
-.30

55.1%
46.6%
14.3%
60.3%
35.6
54.6%
30.4%
18.7%
56.8%
28.0%
$2,574.61
16.3%
19.4%
24.8%
-.30

-.30

-.29

14.0%
-

31,881

16.0%
2,771

Source: U.S. Census, 1990 PUMS 5% sample.

point (55% vs. 61%); less likely have a work-limiting disability
(30% vs. 36%) as well as a work-preventing disability (19% vs.
26%) or to have received public assistance in 1989 (16% vs. 21%).
Migrants were substantially less likely to have been living in
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1985 in the state where they were born (28% vs. 66%), which
is consistent with the idea of "step migration," i.e., that having
already moved out of state increases one's chances of doing so
again. The rate of change in the jobs/working age population
ratio is the same for both groups. (Nor did other measures of job
availability produce any differences.)
These comparisons suggest that migrants were neither the
more needy group nor those most likely to use welfare. Indeed,
the differences strongly suggest that poor, single men move for
reasons quite other than improved prospects of support by General Assistance.4
Table 2 displays the results of a more rigorous test of these
first impressions. It presents the results of a logistic regression
calculating how each of a select group of these variables affects the
likelihood of a poor, single man moving from one state to another
between 1985 to 1990. A logistic regression has a dichotomous dependent variable and calculates the degree to which each variable
affects the probability for the average case in realizing one or the
other value in the dichotomous variable. The logistic results in
Table 2 are for the dichotomous dependent variable of migration
where the possible values are not having moved or having moved.
The results presented estimate the effect of each variable on the
probability of having moved. We are most interested in those
factors where the parameter estimate is significant and indicates
that the variable affects the odds of having moved. Along with
the coefficient estimates from the logistic regression analysis, we
also translate these coefficient estimates in Table 2 into average
probabilities of moving.5
In Table 2, we find that all variables in the equation were
significant except for disability status, which did not affect the
6
probability of moving to another state.
Several factors increased the likelihood of moving. Looking at
the probability estimates in Table 2, however, we find that while
variables often significantly affected the probability of moving,
most often the effect was quite small. The overall probability of
moving is estimated to be 8% on average and all the other probabilities tack quite closely to that norm. Accounting for the other
factors, whites had a 10% probability of moving compared to a
7% probability for nonwhites. Those with more than a 9th-grade
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Table 2
Coefficient and Probability Estimates for the Likelihood of Migration,
For Poor Single Men, Aged 24-54, Without a High School Degree,
1985-90.
Coefficient
Estimate (SE)
Overall
Living in a Top GA State in 1985
Living in a State with No GA in
1985
All Other GA State in 1985
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the
ratio of Workers to Working Age
Pop. for the State of Residence in
1985 ? 1 SD above the Mean
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the
ratio of Workers to Working Age
Pop. for the State of Residence in
1985-1 SD below the Mean
Living in State of Origin
Not Living in Original State
Race=White
Race=Nonwhite
Age-1 SD Above the Mean
Age-ISD Below the Mean
Finished 9th Grade or Beyond
Less Than a 9 th Grade Education
Never Married
Married at Some Point
Disability Status
Intercept

-0.163 ((0.052)**
0.276 (0.050)***

0.712 (0.228)**

Probability
of Moving
8.2%
7.0
10.1
8.0
8.6

7.8

-1.698 (0.045)***
0.468 (0.042)***
-0.29 (0.003)***
0.361 (0.042)***
-0.395 (0.045)***
0.000 (0.046)
-0.640 (0.139)***

* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; and ***= p < .0001.
Note: For continuous variables, the coefficient estimate is given for the first
category of the variable listed in the table. For dummy variables, coefficient
estimates are given for the included variables in the regression models.

Already Hit Bottom

165

education had a 10% probability of moving compared to 7% for
those less educated. Never having been married reduced a poor,
single man's probability of moving out of state to 7%, compared
to a 10% probability for men who had been married at some
point. Men one standard deviation above the mean age had a 7%
probability of moving while those one standard deviation below
the mean had a 10% probability. Residing in the state in which he
was born greatly reduced a man's probability of moving out of
state: to 4% compared to the 16% probability of men who did not
live in their native state in 1985. We also found that men living in
a state with a rate of increase one standard deviation above the
mean in the state's job/working age population ratio had an 9%
probability of moving, while those living in a state one standard
deviation below that mean had a probability of only 8%.
Yet, for our purposes, the most interesting factor to positively
affect the probability of moving was whether a person lived in
a state that did not have a GA program. Living in such a state
increased a man's probability of moving to 10%. Men living in
a state that provided GA statewide to non-elderly, employable
individuals had only a 7% probability of moving.
It seems, then, that the type of GA program in a state does significantly affect the probability that a poor, single man will move;
however, the effect is quite small. The overwhelming majority of
single men in our sample did not move out of state, and their
probability of moving was only slightly revised depending upon
the type of GA program available in their state of residence.
Table 3 presents additional probability estimates that reinforce
the idea that GA has at best a limited effect on migration. The
overall probabilities indicate that the men we studied were about
as likely to move to a state without GA as they were to move to a
top GA state (1.7% vs. 1.6% for the full sample; 21% vs. 19% for the
migrants). Individuals in the full sample from top GA states were
only slightly more likely than average to move to another top GA
state (1.7% vs. 1.6%) and only slightly less likely to move to a nonGA state (1.3% vs. 1.7%). Among migrants, they were somewhat
substantially more likely than average to move to another top-GA
state (25% vs. 19%), while only slightly less likely than average
to move to a non-GA state (19% vs. 21%). Individuals in the full
sample from non-GA states were slightly more likely than others

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

166
Table 3

ProbabilityEstimates for the Likelihood of Migration To a Top GA
State or a Non-GA State, For Poor Single Men, Aged 24-54, Without
a High School Degree, 1985-90.
Full Sample
Probabilityof Moving

Migrants
Probabilityof Moving

To A Top
GA State

To a NonGA State

To A Top
GA State

To a NonGA State

Overall Probability

1.6%

1.7%

19.4%

21.0%

State of Residence in 1985:
Top GA State
Non-GA State
All Other States

1.7
1.9
1.3

1.3
1.5
2.0

25.2

18.9
15.1
24.5

*

*

17.7

= p > .50.

All percentages are based on coefficients that are significant at the .001 level,
unless indicated. Other variables included in the models tested were state of
birth, race, age, level of education, marital status, disability, and rate of change
of the ratio of workers to working age population 1985-89.

to move to a top-GA state (1.9% vs. 1.6%) and slightly less likely
than others to move to a non-GA state (1.5% vs. 1.7%). Among
the migrants, men from non-GA states were not more likely than
average to move to a top-GA state but were somewhat less likely
than average to move to a non-GA state (15% vs. 21%). Yet, other
than these limited effects, migration flows of poor, single men
seem largely unaffected by GA.
But what about the employable migrants who did go to states
where they would be eligible for GA? Were they more likely than
other state residents to be receiving public assistance? Table 4
displays results of a logistic regression which addresses this.7 The
analysis is limited to employable men who in 1990 resided in
top GA states. Table 4 indicates that these migrants had a 28%
probability of receiving public assistance compared to 23% for
non-migrants (and 24% overall). In this sense, then, migration
and GA receipt seem connected. Yet, given the significance of the
other factors listed in Table 4, migration is a marginal influence
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Coefficient and Probability Estimates for the Likelihood of Receiving
Public Assistance, For Poor Single Men, Without a High School
Degree, Without Disabilities that Prevent Working, Living in the Top
GA States, 1990.
Coefficient
Estimate (SE)
Overall
Living In Group Quarters
Living Alone
All Other Living Arrangements
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the ratio
of Workers to Working Age Pop. for
the State of Residence in 1990-1 SD
above the Mean
1985 to 1989 Rate of Change in the ratio
of Workers to Working Age Pop. for
the State of Residence in 1990-1 SD
below the Mean
Migrate
Did Not Migrate
Living in State of Origin
Not Living in State of Origin
Non-Public Assistance Income-1 SD
Above the Mean
Non-Public Assistance Income-1 SD
Below the Mean
Worked Last Year
Did Not Work Last Year
Race=White
Race=Nonwhite
Age-1 SD Above the Mean
Age-1SD Below the Mean
Finished 9 th Grade or Beyond
Less Than a 9 th Grade Education
Disability (Limits Work)
Non-Disabled
Intercept

0.246 (0.124)*
1.022 (0.77)***
-3.505 (1.150)**

Probability
23.7%
19.7
32.5
16.4
22.2

25.1

0.291 (0.139)*
0.332 (0.075)***
-. 0003 (0.00003)***

28.0
23.4
25.7
20.8
10.5
36.0

-. 544 (0.095)***
-. 393 (0.074)***
0.017 (0.004)***
-. 209 (0.072)**
.960 (0.090)***

18.1
26.1
20.4
26.3
25.8
21.2
22.5
25.7
37.7
21.3

-2.595 (.374)

* = p < .05; ** = p < .01; and ***= p < .0001.
Note: For continuous variables, the coefficient estimate is given for the first
category of the variable listed in the table. For dummy variables, coefficient
estimates are given for the included variables in the regression models.
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on the growth of the rolls in top GA states. All of the variables
except marital history affected the probability that members of
this sample of poor single men in top GA states would receive
assistance. Notably, in spite of the fact that the analysis excludes
men with a disability that prevents them from working, we still
find that lesser impairments (affecting the kind and amount of
work a man can do) significantly increased his probability of
taking public assistance. Even in the states that provide GA to
the non-disabled, these modest impairments increase a man's
probability of taking public assistance to 38% compared to 21% for
non-impaired men. This and other findings probably reflect the
greater likelihood that certain poor, single men will leave the labor
force. Men whose age was one standard deviation above the mean
had a 26% probability of receiving public assistance compared to
21% for those whose age was one standard deviation below the
mean. Being white reduced the probability of receiving aid to 20%
compared to 26% for non-whites. Being educated beyond the 9th
grade decreased a man's odds of taking public assistance (23%
compared to 26% for the less educated). Men with non-public
assistance income (in 1989) one standard deviation above the
mean had a 11% probability of receiving public assistance while
those whose non-public assistance income was one standard deviation below the mean had a 36% probability Similarly, having
worked in the past year reduced a man's probability of taking
assistance to 18% compared to 26% for those who did not work.
Not surprisingly, job growth was negatively related to receiving
aid, though the effect was slight. Poor, single men living alone
(in a household of one person) also had a heightened probability
of receiving assistance: They had a 33% probability compared to
20% for men living in group quarters and 16% for men in all other
living arrangements. Lastly, men living in their state of origin
were more likely to receive assistance (26% compared to 21% for
those men not living in their state of origin).8
In sum, in top GA states, advancing age, impairment, lack
of education, lack of recent work history, lack of material resources generally, a relatively loose labor market-and non-white
status-have most to do with whether a man collects public
assistance. Migration is a relatively trivial factor.
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CONCLUSION: ASSESSING GA MIGRATION IN CONTEXT
The dramatic national welfare reforms of recent years have
been animated in good part by concerns that welfare recipients
are inured to dependency The welfare migrant has been used to
personify this attitude and policymakers have used the spectre
of welfare migration to rationalize welfare retrenchment. Such
imagery has been at work in policymaking for state GA programs
for a long time and it is in these programs where many of the
recent approaches to retrenchment-time limits, behavioral requirements, and workfare, in particular-were tested out.
The preceding analysis suggests a need to reconceptualize
the issue of welfare migration. Put simply, our findings do not
support the claim that relatively generous states attract utilitymaximizing migrants. Although poor, single men arguably have
greater capacities than other impoverished people to move across
state lines, our analysis reveals that generous benefits exerted
few, if any, "magnetic effects." It seems that in all but the most
extreme cases, generous benefits are unlikely to exert a "pull"
strong enough to induce migration. It seems that poor people,
like other people, are interested in more than government benefits
(or other financial considerations) when they make residential
decisions. Among other things, they are likely to care about the
quality of their social relations, including networks of family and
friends that serve as critical sources of support. In this important
sense, the earliest studies of welfare migration seem more to the
point than later studies which emphasized utility maximization.
On the other hand, restrictions on aid that threaten the survival of poor people may "push" them across political borders. We
find evidence that poor, single men leave bottom-tier GA states
in greater than expected numbers, thought not for top GA states.
We suspect that more evidence of this sort will be forthcoming
as states implement new, restrictive reforms under the TANF
system.
NOTES
1. The question of whether a state can require recipients who have lived
there less than 12 months to receive the benefits of they would have
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

gotten in their prior state of residence is before the U.S. Supreme Court
in the case of Anderson v. Roe (98-97). See Hershkoff and Loffredo (1997:
43-44) and Zubler (1997) for a discussion of the constitutional and legal
issues involved.
A caveat is in order here: Our analysis does not concern intrastate
migration. Of the men we studied, 49.1% made an intrastate move
between 1985 and 1990. Of those who did not move out of state between 1985 and 1990, 52.9% moved to a different house. In states like
California, where GA benefits vary greatly among the counties, some
of these moves may be GA-related. Given our analysis of interstate
moves, we doubt that such is the case, but only further research will
tell. Research of this sort will need to rely on state and local data bases.
We based our initial classification on 1987 data compiled by the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities (Shapiro and Greenstein 1987). We then
checked these against a 1989 report prepared for the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (Lewin/ICF and James Bell Associates
1990). Finally, because the status of 7 states remained unclear, we
validated these entries through phone interviews with state-level administrators.
Examination of the same variables for all poor, single males and for
all single males regardless of income indicated similar results as those
reported in Table 1.
Probability estimates were determined by multiplying the actual variable value of each sample member by the coefficient estimate from
the multivariate model. These Xb estimates were then used within
a logistic regression equation, which takes the form 1/(l+e-b), for
each sample member. On the basis of this calculation, means values
for these probability estimates were determined. Thus, the probability
estimates refer to the average probability of migrating, given particular
characteristics.
Disability is measured in the PUMS both as limiting and preventing
work in 1990. Table 2 presents results for work-limiting but not workpreventing disability. When the latter is used in the equation instead,
it is significantly negatively related to migration. It does not, however,
appreciably change the results for the other variables, except to decrease
the significance of the variable for living in a state with no GA. We
would expect work-preventing disability to discourage migration for
two reasons. First, individuals with such disabilities are more likely to
stay where they know they can count on family, friends and available
community and medical services. Second, many people with workpreventing disabilities collect SSI, a program with a national benefit floor. Although some states supplement the national SSI benefit
minimum, state supplements are not so great as to create any likely
migration pull given the other concerns of these disabled individuals.
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Disability that prevents work, therefore, not only is very likely to
discourage migration to another state but it also most often qualifies an
individual for SSI making the move for GA moot. Yet, both disability
variables are of limited utility since they measure disability only in 1990
and not retrospectively back to 1985 at the beginning of the period we
are studying. The work-limiting disability variable is, however, at least
relevant to the GA population. Using no disability variable produces
essentially the same results as reported in Table 2 for the other variables.
Nor does removing individuals with work-preventing disabilities from
the sample affect the results.
7. Public assistance, as measured in the PUMS, includes SSI and AFDC as
well as GA. Members of our sample did not qualify for AFDC because
they were not living with children. If they were sufficiently disabled,
they could qualify for SSI; however, we exclude at this point people with
disabilities that prevent them from working. Therefore, the people who
indicated receipt of public assistance here should be receiving GA.
8. In a test not shown here, we found that migrants returning to their state
of origin were no more likely than anyone else to take GA.
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